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REMEDIES IN THE UCC: SOME CRITICAL THOUGHTS 
Victor Goldberg* 
I thank the conference organizers and the law review for giving me the 
opportunity to vent some of my frustrations with the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC). I have expressed my concerns with the Code’s overreliance on “custom and 
usage” elsewhere, and will not pursue that further here.1 Nor will I bemoan the 
Code’s invocation of good faith to undo the parties’ balancing of flexibility and 
reliance.2 I will confine my discussion to contract remedies. But I have to begin by 
noting one section I simply do not understand. Why on earth would the Code drafters 
in § 2–718(2)(b) have required restitution of nonrefundable deposits in excess of 
$500? A standard that undid “unreasonable” deposits might conceivably make some 
sense, but a price fixed in 1965 (when the price level has increased more than 500%) 
is daft.  
Let me begin with consequential damages. When I began teaching Contracts in 
the last century, it struck me as obvious that the right question to ask was with whom 
the parties would have assigned the responsibility for the damages. Upon reading § 
2–715 Comment 2, I learned, much to my surprise, that the “‘tacit agreement’ test 
for the recovery of consequential damages is rejected.”3 The commentary regarding 
the tacit agreement framing, summarized by Larry Garvin, is scathing.4 Supporters 
of the Code’s formulation ask: would reasonable business people have contemplated 
the possibility? If they somehow conclude that the contemplation threshold has been 
met, the plaintiff wins. The tacit agreement approach asks even if that threshold had 
been met, how would those same reasonable business people allocate the risks? 
Thus, both the supporters and critics make a tacit assumption about risk allocation. 
They just disagree on what that assumption is. 
Heretofore, I had not bothered to read the next sentence in Comment 2: 
“Although the older rule at common law which made the seller liable for all 
consequential damages of which he had ‘reason to know’ in advance is followed . . 
. .” That is a rewriting of history. The 11th edition of Mayne’s Treatise on Contract 
Damages (1946) asked: “Is mere knowledge or communication sufficient to impose 
 ________________________  
 * Oberlin College B.A. 1963; Yale University PhD 1970. Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional 
Studies, Columbia University School of Law. I would like to thank participants in the conference for their helpful 
remarks. 
     1.  See VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 162–88 (2006) 
(criticizing the decision in Columbia Nitrogen v. Royster, 451 F. 2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971)). 
 2. See id. at 101–41. 
 3. U.C.C. § 2–715 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 4. See Larry T. Garvin, Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co. and the Dark Side of Reputation, 12 
NEV. L.J. 659 (2012). 
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liability?”5 The answer was: NO. The rule changed abruptly in 1949 with Asquith, 
LJ’s opinion in Victoria Laundry v. Newman.6 Asquith, like the Code authors, 
misstated the history, but he went a step further. Given the facts, the plaintiff would 
have lost; so he misstated the facts.7  
There is some pretty good evidence that parties would assign the risk of 
consequential damages to the plaintiff. Disclaimers of consequential damages are 
routine. If most parties are contracting out of the default rule, then it is probably not 
a very good rule. The default rule will, however, sometimes come into play, notably 
when there is a battle of the forms. Why might the parties assign the risk to the 
plaintiff? As Coase pointed out in another context, both parties contribute to the 
harm.8 The defendant controls the risk that something will go wrong, but the plaintiff 
controls the magnitude of the damages, were the risk to occur, both by post–incident 
(mitigation) and pre–incident behavior. If defendants are invariably held liable, the 
plaintiff’s incentives to control the costs are weakened. The defendant, in effect, 
would be providing insurance without some of the tools it might use to ameliorate 
the moral hazard and adverse selection problems. That insurance would be a cost of 
doing business, of course, and the defendants would have to cover that cost by 
charging higher rates to customers.9  
Turning now to direct damages,10 I will focus on three issues: (a) the relationship 
between market damages and cover; (b) damages for anticipatory repudiation; and 
(c) the lost volume seller. Some scholars perceive a conflict between the UCC 
remedies for a buyer’s breach. 11  Section 2–706 allows the seller to resell the goods 
(to cover) while § 2–708(1) gives the contract–market differential. The argument is 
that these might differ if, for example, the seller delays in reselling and the price has 
risen in the interim. The resale, it is argued, is the cover transaction and the seller 
would, in effect, have its cake and eat it too. White and Summers take this position: 
“We conclude that a seller should not be permitted to recover more under 2–708(1) 
than under 2–706. . . .”12  
Rather than viewing cover as a separate remedy, I suggest it should instead be 
viewed as evidence of the contract–market differential. The persuasiveness of the 
evidence from a subsequent resale would depend on the temporal proximity; if the 
 ________________________  
 5. JOHN D. MAYNE, MAYNE’S TREATISE ON DAMAGES 28 (W. G. Earengy ed., Sweet & Maxwell 11th ed., 
1946). 
 6. Victoria Laundry, Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. [1949] 2 KB 528 (Eng.). 
 7. See Victor P. Goldberg, Victoria Laundry’s, Dirty Linen, 2 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 523, 526 
(2017). 
 8. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). 
 9. See generally, VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT DESIGN 87–115 
(2015), for a more detailed version of my argument. 
 10. The line between direct and consequential damages is not as bright as one might hope; compare 
Goldberg, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW, PART I (Direct Damages) with RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW, PART II 
(Consequential Damages). 
 11. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8–7, at 362 (6th ed. 2010); 
See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Conflicting Formulas for Measuring Expectation Damages, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 
399–400. For examples of judicial treatment, see Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 1083 (9th Cir. 
1979), Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Holborn Oil Co., 547 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1016–17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), and Eades 
Commodities, Co. v. Hoeper, 825 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo. App. Ct. 1992). 
 12. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 362. 
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seller were to resell promptly that would be good evidence of the market price. If the 
resale occurred three years later (as in Peace River Seed Co–Operative, Ltd. v. 
Proseeds Marketing, Inc. 13), it would be terrible evidence. Nonetheless, at least one 
scholar, following White and Summers, has argued that the higher price three years 
later was the cover price, and the measured damages should have been adjusted 
accordingly.14 
Acceptance of the cover–as–evidence formulation avoids a problem that has 
bedeviled some courts: what if the aggrieved party had entered into numerous 
contracts following the breach? Which, if any, is the cover contract? Cargill, Inc. v. 
Stafford15 is an extreme example of a court’s confusion. The court was dealing with 
the question of the proper date for measuring damages following an anticipatory 
repudiation. The court concluded that the answer depended on whether the aggrieved 
party had a valid reason for not covering. Leave aside for the moment that this 
question made no sense. The court asserted: “The record contains scant, if any, 
evidence that Cargill covered the wheat.”16 And again: “The record does not show 
that Cargill covered or attempted to cover. Nothing in the record shows the continued 
availability or nonavailability of substitute wheat.”17 And so the case was remanded 
to determine whether Cargill had a valid reason for failing to cover. Think about it. 
Cargill was (and still is) a major player in a thick market. It engages in numerous 
wheat transactions every day. It makes no sense to identify any particular trade as 
the cover contract. Of course there was no evidence of Cargill covering or not 
covering. Neither lawyer should have thought it necessary to mention Cargill’s 
ongoing presence in the wheat market. 
Well then, when should damages be measured if there is an anticipatory 
repudiation? Some courts and commentators distinguish between cases in which all 
performance would have been concluded before the decision and those in which 
some performance would have been due after the litigation had concluded. The Code 
(§ 2–723) is specific for the latter case:  
If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial before 
the time for performance with respect to some or all of the goods, 
any damages based on market price (Section 2–708 or Section 2–
713) shall be determined according to the price of such goods 
prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of the 
repudiation.18 
White and Summers reason that the Code’s silence in the pre–litigation case 
meant that the opposite rule should apply—the rule would be the time performance 
 ________________________  
 13. Peace River Seed Coop., Ltd. v. Proseeds Mktg., Inc. 322 P.3d 531, 533 (Or. 2014). 
 14. See Jennifer S. Martin, Opportunistic Resales and the Uniform Commercial Code, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 
487, 525 (2016). 
 15. See generally Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford, 553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 16. Id. at 1226. 
 17. Id. at 1227. 
 18. U.C.C. § 2–723 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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was due. Thus, they claim, the date at which damages should be measured depends 
on whether or not all the performance was due before or after the court would render 
its decision.19 
I prefer making the pre– and post–litigation rules the same to avoid the 
possibility that, in some instances, the parties might have the incentive to delay or 
accelerate the litigation. The choice, then, is between the price at the time at which 
the breach is accepted and the price at the time of performance. More precisely, that 
first choice is the forward price—the price at the time of the breach for goods to be 
delivered at the time of performance. The expected value of the price at the time of 
performance and the forward price at the time of the repudiation is the same. So, the 
choice should not matter too much as long as the rule is known beforehand.  
The decisions go both ways. White and Summers enthusiastically endorse the 
opinion in Hess Energy, Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co.,20 which measured damages at the 
time of performance:  
In affirming Hess’ jury verdict . . . the Fourth Circuit agrees with 
our interpretation and arguments . . . for the proposition that 2–713 
measures the contract market difference at the time of delivery not 
at the time of repudiation in a repudiation case. Hurray for Judge 
Niemeyer.21 
In Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft,22 the court, 
after calling the problem “one of the most difficult interpretive problems of the 
Uniform Commercial Code,”23 chose the time at which the repudiation was accepted 
(or a reasonable time thereafter).   
Thomas Jackson used Oloffson v. Coomer24 in developing his argument for the 
time of repudiation. 25 A farmer (Coomer) promised in April to sell 40,000 bushels 
of corn to a grain dealer for delivery in October and December. However, in June 
 ________________________  
 19. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 325 n.8. That was the position taken by the Second Circuit in 
Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769 F.2d 902 (1985), in which the buyer repudiated a contract for the 
sale of 1,000 metric tons per month of aluminum: 
We would accept Southwire’s argument that the date Trans World learned of the repudiation 
would be the correct date on which to calculate the market price had this action been tried 
before the time for full performance under the contract. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2–723(1) (market 
price at time aggrieved party learned of repudiation used to calculate damages in action for 
anticipatory repudiation that “comes to trial before time for performance with respect to some 
or all of the goods”). However, where damages are awarded after the time for full 
performance, as in this case, the calculation of damages under § 2–708(1) should reflect the 
actual market price at each successive date when tender was to have been made under the 
repudiated installment contract. 
 20. Hess Energy, Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co, 338 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 21. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 7–7, at 325–26.  
 22. Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 23. Id. at 1066.  
 24. See generally Oloffson v. Coomer, 296, N.E.2d 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 
 25. See Thomas H. Jackson, “Anticipatory Repudiation” And The Temporal Element Of Contract Law: An 
Economic Inquiry Into Contract Damages In Cases Of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69, 81–94 
(1978). 
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Coomer informed Oloffson that, because the season had been too wet, he would not 
be planting any corn. The contract price was about $1.12, and the price for future 
delivery at that time was $1.16. The market price rose substantially in the months 
after the repudiation. Oloffson ultimately purchased corn at much higher prices after 
the delivery dates had passed ($1.35 and $1.49) and argued that his damages should 
be based on those prices. The court held that, given the nature of the market, a 
commercially reasonable time to await performance was less than a day and used the 
forward price at the time of repudiation ($1.16) when calculating damages.26 
Professor Jackson asserted that “contract law presumptively should adopt a general 
rule that an aggrieved buyer should cover at the forward price as of the date of the 
repudiation.”27 
While this is essentially the same position I have taken, Oloffson does raise one 
issue. The court noted that Oloffson had argued that he had “adhered to a usage of 
trade that permitted his customers to cancel the contract for a future delivery of grain 
by making known to him a desire to cancel and paying to him the difference between 
the contract and market price on the day of cancellation.”28 At first, this seems an 
odd point for Oloffson to make. Why should he care about the difference between 
the spot and forward price? His argument was that because Coomer had failed to 
give notice, Coomer could not take advantage of the usage and that damages should 
be measured by the price at the dates of performance ($1.35 and $1.49). That’s a non 
sequitur—why jump to this default rule? Regardless, the court rejected this argument 
because, it claimed, Coomer did not know of the alleged usage, and good faith 
required that Oloffson inform him of that usage. Absent the usage, the court then 
opted for the forward price at the time of the repudiation. Remarkably, White and 
Summers get this completely wrong. They reluctantly concede that “[t]he outcome 
of the case can be defended only on the ground that the contract was implicitly 
modified by the trade usage that prevailed in the corn market. . . .”29 But, the court 
rejected the trade usage (spot price) and chose instead the forward price. The White 
and  Summers preferred rule, price at the time of performance, wasn’t even in the 
running.  
To call this a trade usage is an understatement. It was the rule of the National 
Grain and Feed Dealers Association (NGFDA): “cancel the defaulted portion of the 
contract at fair market value based on the close of the market the next business 
day.”30 So, it appears that the standard rule in the grain trade is to use the spot price, 
not the forward price. In this instance, the difference between the spot and forward 
price is unimportant. For a storable commodity (wheat or corn), the spot price plus 
the expected costs of storage is a good approximation of the forward price.  
 ________________________  
 26. Oloffson, 296 N.E.2d at 874. (“Since Coomer’s statement to Oloffson on June 3, 1970, was unequivocal 
and since ‘cover’ easily and immediately was available to Oloffson in the well–organized and easily accessible 
market for purchases of grain to be delivered in the future, it would be unreasonable for Oloffson on June 3, 1970, 
to have awaited Coomer’s performance….”).  
 27. Jackson, supra note 25, at 94. 
 28. Oloffson, 296 N.E.2d at 875.  
 29. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 6.3 
 30. NGFA Grain Trade Rules, 28(A)(3). 
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While § 2–723 is the Code’s response to multi–year contracts, it is not 
particularly helpful. White and Summers recognize that “long–term contracts for the 
sale of commodities such as oil, gas, coal, nuclear fuel and the like do not have fixed 
quantities for remote time periods.”31 What to do? “We think a court should be 
generous in listening to an aggrieved party’s expert testimony about projections.”32 
That does not give us much to go on.  
Suppose that a buyer were to repudiate a twenty–year contract in year three. The 
agreement could have all sorts of bells and whistles. The contract could include a 
price adjustment mechanism (perhaps an index), or a gross inequity (or hardship) 
clause that would allow a disgruntled party to appeal to an arbitrator or court to reset 
the price. The contract might have a mechanism that would allow one of the parties 
to terminate the agreement under certain circumstances. Quantity need not be fixed. 
It could be determined by the buyer (requirements contract) or seller (output 
contract). The contract might include a take–or–pay or minimum quantity clause, 
and that might be modified with a makeup clause. Section 2–723 instructs the court 
to base damages on the “market price” at the date that the aggrieved party “learn[s] 
of the repudiation.” What is that price?  
White and Summers suggest that the price at the time of the repudiation should 
be used for the remaining 17 years33 and some courts—the Tenth Circuit in 
Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.34 and the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court in Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc.35—have taken the same 
position. But even if we accept the notion that the price would be constant for the 
entire period, it still does not take into account the many non–price aspects of the 
contract. The decisions tend to focus on the price of the product—the difference 
between the contract and market price. The relevant concern should be the change 
in the value of the contract at the time of the repudiation. I am not claiming that 
ascertaining that will be easy to do. But I am claiming that this is the appropriate 
conceptual framework. Dueling experts would undoubtedly disagree on future prices 
and quantities, and on the seller’s ability to mitigate by finding alternative buyers, as 
well as other aspects of the contract. Nonetheless, their concern would be the value 
of the contract, not just the price term.36 
The take–or–pay contract is one type of long–term contract that has caused some 
confusion. In a take–or–pay, the buyer promises that it will pay the contract price for 
a certain quantity whether or not it actually takes anything. Suppose a 20–year 
contract that sets the take at 1,000 tons per year. In the first year, the buyer takes only 
400 tons. What damages? While this is sometimes characterized as a breach by the 
 ________________________  
 31. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 7–8. 
 32. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 7–8. 
 33. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 334 (qualifying this by accepting any price information that would 
become available in the period between repudiation and trial). 
 34. Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Nat. Gas. Co., a Div. of Internorth, 862 F.2d 1439, 1448 (10th Cir. 
1988). 
 35. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993). 
 36. For an example of how much the expert valuations might diverge, see Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. 
v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 108 (2d. Cir. 2007) (plaintiff’s expert concluding that the damages 
exceeded $500 million; defendant’s expert concluding that damages were zero). 
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buyer, it isn’t. The buyer would simply owe the contract price multiplied by the 600–
ton shortfall. The only breach would be the buyer’s refusal to pay. What if the market 
collapsed and the buyer then repudiated the contract? The seller, which previously 
had to remain ready to perform for the ensuing 19 years would now be released from 
its obligation. It could mitigate by selling to others or (if continued production were 
not worthwhile) by ceasing to produce. The damages would be the difference 
between the future revenues had the contract been performed and the future revenues 
given the new market reality.37 
My final concern is the so–called lost volume seller.38 The basic issue in the lost 
volume cases is that if the buyer cancels an order (breaches), and the seller 
“mitigates” by selling the unit at the same price to another buyer, an award of the 
contract–market differential would result in zero damages. However, so goes the 
story, if the second buyer would have bought a unit from the seller anyway, the seller 
would have had two sales, not one. The seller would have lost the “profit” on the 
sale that got away. Making the seller whole would require that it be compensated for 
the profit it would have made, but for the breach.39 That seems plausible. For White 
and Summers that remedy is “the recovery which all right–minded people would 
agree the lost volume seller should have.”40  
Nonetheless, I claim, all those “right–minded people” are wrong. By cancelling 
the order, the buyer, in effect, would be invoking an implied termination clause. The 
remedy would be the price the buyer would have to pay for termination (cancellation) 
if the contract were otherwise silent.41 When framed this way, it becomes clear that 
the lost profits remedy misprices the buyer’s option. I am not proposing a test in 
which we compare the proposed remedy to some idealized alternative (like 
efficiency). The standard I am applying is more forgiving—is the contract imposed 
by the court absurd? The lost profit remedy, I will argue, fails that test. When the 
parties have not set an explicit option price (perhaps as a nonrefundable deposit) and 
market conditions have not changed, the appropriate default rule should be zero 
damages. 
While § 2–708(2) was meant to deal only with the exceptional case in which the 
normal remedies (§ 2–706 and § 2–708(1)) proved inadequate, some scholars have 
argued that it is, or should be, the dominant remedy. Childres and Burgess, for 
example, claimed:  
 ________________________  
 37. “Take–or–pay” and “minimum quantity” contracts are basically the same. So, for example, in the 
casebook favorite, Lake River v. Carborundum, 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985), the shortfall at the end of the three–
year period would not have been a breach, but the buyer’s failure to pay would have been. Damages would have 
been the price multiplied by the shortfall. In Judge Posner’s hypothetical in which he had the buyer repudiate the 
contract on the first day, damages would have not been the price times the quantity. Lake River would have been 
freed of its obligation to provide bagging services to Carborundum; its resources could instead be used for other 
purposes, mitigating the damages. For more on this, see generally Victor P. Goldberg, Reckoning Contract 
Damages: Valuation Of The Contract As An Asset, 75 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 301 (2018). 
 38. See Victor P. Goldberg, Lost Volume Seller, R.I.P., (COLUM. L. & ECON., Working Paper No. 562, 2017). 
 39. U.C.C. § 2–708(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 40. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 8–13. 
 41. For a similar argument, see generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the 
Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428 (2004).  
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[T]he lost-profit rule of 2–708(2) is no rule of last resort for the few 
cases that fail to fit the specific rules. It is the dominant damages 
rule or principle. . . .  We think it probable that in the American 
economy of today and the foreseeable future, the overwhelming 
proportion of sales contracts should produce the 2–708(2) situation 
if repudiated by the buyer.42 
Fortunately, that has not come to pass, but § 2–708(2) is still capable of real 
mischief. 
The simple point is this: buyers would often be willing to pay a price for the 
option to terminate (or cancel), but that price bears no resemblance to the implicit 
option price of the lost profit remedy. Parties can price the option with nonrefundable 
deposits, progress payments, and other devices. Sadly, the law, with its skepticism 
regarding liquidated damages (and that unfortunate § 2–718(2) referred to in my 
opening paragraph) can sometimes get in the way.  
Suppose a consumer orders a large consumer durable—a car, boat, or mobile 
home—and before delivery it cancels the order (breaches the contract).43 
Manufacturers pay retailers indirectly for retailing services; that price is the average 
price of retailing services the difference between the wholesale and retail price (the 
gross margin). If a car dealer had no difficulty getting additional units, the lost 
volume remedy would be the gross margin.44 If lost profits were the remedy, the 
contract in effect says that the buyer promised to pay the gross margin (unknown to 
the buyer but probably around 10% of the contract price) for the option to buy the 
car for 90% of the sale price. 
If, however, the dealer could not get more units (perhaps because it was a “hot” 
car that the manufacturer had on allocation), then there would not be any lost volume, 
and the seller would be restricted to the contract–market price differential—which 
would be zero. In effect, the lost volume profit rule sets the option price at the gross 
margin in normal times, but as the market gets tighter (as the dealer’s chances of 
obtaining an additional car from the manufacturer diminish) the lost volume measure 
(option price) falls. There is no good economic reason for such a result. Indeed, it is 
perverse. Other things equal, the tighter the market, the greater the option price 
should be. The lost volume remedy sets the option price high when the market is 
slack and low when it is tight, the opposite of what a rational dealer would do.  
 ________________________  
 42. Robert Childres & Robert K. Burgess, Seller’s Remedies: The Primacy of UCC 2-708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 833, 881–82 (1973); see also John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: An Agenda for Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 360, 366 (1981) (“Although this profit plus overhead recovery 
may have been seen by the Code’s drafters as a provision that would apply only infrequently, it is now recognized 
that, at least in theory, this will be the appropriate measure of damages in a substantial majority of cases involving 
merchant sellers.”) and Roy Ryden Anderson, Damages For Sellers Under The Code’s Profit Formula, 40 SW. L.J. 
1021, 1063. (“Under the Code’s scheme the profit formula of section 2–708(2) is truly the dominant damage remedy 
for aggrieved sellers who suffer a breach prior to the time that the buyer accepts the goods. The formula applies to 
most commercial sellers because such sellers are usually left in a lost volume situation by a buyer’s breach.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (1972) Many contracts casebooks include it to 
illustrate the lost volume seller problem. 
 44. See U.C.C. § 2–708, cmt. 2, (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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The intuitive appeal of the lost volume remedy in the retail context is that the 
gross margin is a rough approximation of the average price of retailing services. That 
intuition does not carry over to the manufacturer context. There, the loss would be 
the difference between the contract price and the seller’s “but–for” costs. So, if, a 
seller were in an R&D intensive industry, the “lost profits” could be a very large 
fraction of the contract price. For example in Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Industries, 
Inc.,45 the contract price was about $98,000 for a product with a substantial R&D 
component. All the parties, including the court, presumed that the lost volume 
remedy was appropriate and their only issue was whether some labor costs should 
be treated as fixed or variable. The variable costs were about $22,000. Thus, the 
contract that the court created said in effect that the buyer was willing to pay $76,000 
for the option to buy the goods for $22,000. No one asked the simple question: why 
on earth would it do something that stupid? Are there any circumstances in which a 
buyer would be willing to enter into such an arrangement? Yes, some. If the seller 
relied on this particular buyer (say in a long–term coal contract) or if the item were 
highly customized with little market value if the buyer were to cancel, a high 
cancellation fee (option price) would be plausible.  Of course, in neither of these 
cases would the seller expect to be able to sell to this buyer and another. The seller 
would not be a lost volume seller. Once we make the contract structure explicit—an 
option price that was over 70% of the contract price—it is clear that no “right–
minded person” would have voluntarily entered into such a contract. 
Ironically, courts and commentators that claim to be troubled by the possible 
punitive aspects of a liquidated damages clause would routinely apply § 2–708(2), 
notwithstanding the fact that the lost profits remedy is often more punitive. Two 
cases will illustrate this point. In R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc.,46 the 
buyer cancelled an order for an MRI machine. There was a non–refundable deposit 
of $300,000.47 The buyer sued for the return of the deposit, and Diasonics 
counterclaimed for its lost profits. The court granted the return of the deposit (citing 
§ 2–718(2)(b)) but held that Diasonics could be a lost volume seller. The court 
remanded to determine whether Diasonics could have produced the second unit 
profitably; on remand it found that Diasonics could and that the lost volume damages 
were in excess of $450,000. For my purposes, the significant point is that the court 
was comfortable with the notion that the $300,000 down payment would be an 
unenforceable penalty, but a $450,000 lost profits award would not be.   
Even more bizarre was Rodriguez v. Learjet.48 Learjet sold an airplane for future 
delivery with the contract calling for a series of progress payments when certain 
milestones were reached.  The buyer made the first payment of $250,000, canceled 
the order shortly thereafter, and then asked for the return of the payment. The 
payment was, it asserted, a penalty. Lear subsequently sold the jet to another 
customer for a “profit” of $1,887,464. Here is where it gets weird. To show that the 
liquidated damages were not unreasonable, Learjet argued that it was a lost volume 
 ________________________  
 45. Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 676 F.2d 865 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 46. R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 47. Id. (ignoring the fact that the deposit was non–refundable. The full payment terms are in the contract, a 
copy of which is available from the author). 
 48. Rodriguez v, Learjet, Inc., 946 P.2d 1010 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997). 
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seller. If the lost volume profits were greater than the liquidated damages, then the 
liquidated damages would be reasonable, and the $250,000 would not be a penalty. 
The court concluded that Learjet’s lost volume profits were the $1.8+ million profit 
that it received in the subsequent sale. Since $1.8 million is greater than $250,000, 
there was no penalty. (The court says nothing about why Learjet preferred $250,000; 
my presumption is that it was more interested in establishing the legality of its 
progress payments than in making a one–time killing.) My point is that the court 
considered the $250,000 payment to be at least problematic while suggesting that an 
award seven times that would be just fine. 
I could go on with more illustrations,49 but I think this is enough to make my 
point. Awarding lost volume profits fixes an implied option price, one that has 
perverse effects, setting the price high when the market is slack and low when it is 
tight. More generally, the implied option price is simply unrelated to any plausible 
function. And to make matters even worse, courts will overrule explicit options as 
penalties to replace them with the implicit lost–volume option price (that might be 
even bigger). 
There remains a puzzle. Why is it that so many “right–thinking people” have 
been thinking about it the wrong way for so long? How, for example, could the 
implied option price in Teledyne be so absurdly high and yet neither the lawyers nor 
the judge even noticed the absurdity?  Part of the explanation, I believe, is the view 
that canceling an order (breaching a contract) is a wrong to be redressed. Rather, the 
question should be framed as a matter of pricing the buyer’s termination option. In 
the absence of an explicit option price, the default rule should set the price at zero. 
Suppose that all my criticisms of the Code are correct. What can be done? The 
last attempt to rewrite the Code collapsed and I doubt that anyone would dare revive 
that effort. That leaves interpretation. I feel fairly confident that my concerns with 
§§ 2–706, 2–708(1) and 2–723 can be adequately handled. Indeed, White and 
Summers suggest that their interpretation of the conflict between § 2–706 and § 2–
708(1) is contestable.50 And, as noted above, their view is that § 2–723 is not really 
capable of dealing with the repudiation of long-term contracts. I am a bit less 
sanguine about § 2–708(2), although I have suggested elsewhere a number of 
possible arguments.51 The most persuasive for me is the canon of interpretation that 
language should not produce an absurd result. 
 
 ________________________  
 49. See Goldberg, The Lost Volume Seller, supra note 38. 
 50. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 421 (“We conclude that a seller should not be permitted to recover 
more under 2–708(1) than under 2–706, but we admit we are swimming upstream against a heavy current of 
implication which flows from the comments and the Code history.”) 
 51. See Goldberg, The Last Volume Seller, supra note 38. 
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